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Abstract
Cybersecurity concerns are present in all nations, but the exact nature of the threats 
differs depending on the country and/or region. Therefore there is a need to assess 
the threats and impacts for specific countries. This article presents a high-level 
analysis of “newsworthy” cyber-incidents that affected South Africa. The 54 incidents 
that are considered are categorised according to impact type, perpetrator type, and 
victim type, and the trends are assessed. It was found that the most common impact 
type was data exposure, which was also one that had increased noticeably in recent 
years. The most prevalent perpetrator type was found to be hacktivists, which had 
also exhibited a recent increase in activity. A particularly concerning trend was the 
recent high number of incidents of data exposure caused by error, a trend running 
contrary to the drive to improve cybersecurity. It was also found that of the incidents 
considered, 54% targeted state-owned or political entities as victims. In general, the 
results appeared consistent with global reported trends.
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1. Introduction
Concerns over cybersecurity are growing globally, fuelled by reports of ever-larger 
data breaches and a lack of skilled cyber-security professionals (Fearn, 2017). 
However, most organisations and nations seem to be at a loss of how to effectively 
respond. For instance, even though UK organisations have been found to generally 
consider cyber-security important, only 44% have implemented a cyber-security 
strategy (Ashford, 2017). Slay, quoted in Tate (2017), indicates that Australia has a 
lack of experienced cyber-security professionals. Reports from Kenya indicate that 
cyber-security is lagging, despite increased uptake of Internet services (Matinde, 
2017). Similarly, reports in South Africa suggest that cyber-security is “reaching a 
critical point” in the country (SABC News, 2017).
Whilst the concerns of security are common across all regions, the exact nature of the 
threat types and motivations vary geographically as illustrated in Brown and Rudis 
(2017). Therefore it is necessary to assess the relevant trends in one’s region to ensure 
the security measures and strategies are aligned to the threat activity. This article 
presents a high-level analysis of “newsworthy” cyber-incidents that targeted South 
Africa. The next section scans relevant literature, followed by a description of the 
methodology used. Summaries of the incidents are provided, after which the analysis 
is presented. The results are discussed with reference to the literature, and the article 
is then concluded.
2. Literature
There are different types of cyber-attacks, and some receive more hype than others. 
Receiving significant attention are instances of nation-state cyber-espionage, which 
are closely linked to advanced persistent threats (APTs). These have been found 
to be constantly present in the global cyber-threat environment, but the number 
of organisations affected by these is low unless they are in the specific target group 
for the attackers (Brown & Rudis, 2017). Ransomware is another threat operated 
by cyber-criminals that is receiving much attention. The number of ransomware 
payloads increased internationally from 18% of detections in January 2016 to 66% 
in November 2016. Only 1% of ransomware detections occur in Africa meaning 
that all the other populated continents, however, are much more heavily affected 
(Malwarebytes Labs, 2017). 
In addition to the state-sponsored persistent attacks and criminal ransomware attacks 
mentioned above, the major threat types include: insider threats, either malicious or 
accidental, resulting in security incidents; attacks by hacktivists who are politically 
or ideologically motivated; and attacks by individual hackers who are trying to learn 
or show off, such as the “script kiddies” who make use of existing tools (Andress & 
Winterfield, 2014).
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It has been reported that South Africa lost approximately ZAR50 billion in 2014 
due to cyber-incidents, and that over half a billion online personal records were lost 
or accessed illegally in South Africa during 2015 (SABC News, 2017). Estimates in 
2011 put the financial losses from cyber-attacks at ZAR 3.7 billion in direct losses 
and ZAR6.5 billion in indirect costs (Norton South Africa, 2012). The threat will 
become more widespread going forward as the number of South African Internet 
users increases, aided by the African continent’s increasing undersea capacity (Song, 
2017).
The South African legislative context relating to online privacy and security is 
expanding. The foundational act from which the other acts derive is the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (ECT) of 2002 (RSA, 2002). The Regulation 
of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-Related 
Information Act (RICA) was also promulgated in 2002 (RSA, 2002). The Protection 
of Personal Information (POPI) Bill was released in 2009, and enacted in 2013 (RSA, 
2009; RSA, 2013), but has yet to come into full effect. The National Cybersecurity 
Policy Framework was released at the end of 2015 (SSA, 2015), followed by drafts 
of the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill (Department of Justice and Correctional 
Services, 2017). 
Patrick (2015) has illustrated a lack of information flow regarding cyber-security 
in government departments, and the need for response teams. Chandarman (2016) 
has found that South African students sometimes over-estimate their knowledge 
regarding security threats and techniques, possibly putting them at risk. Dlamini 
and Modise (2012) interrogated awareness initiatives in the country up to 2012 and 
found that the focus of the initiatives appeared to be on tertiary institutions and 
schools. It thus seems clear that the cyber-security landscape in South Africa has 
room to improve.
3. Methodology
The research for this article analysed a number of documented cyber-incidents related 
to South Africa. The data were identified through scrutiny of published reports, news 
items, postings to email mailing lists, cross-referencing via document reference lists, 
and targeted online searches for additional information on documented incidents. A 
total of 54 incidents spanning 23 years, from April 1994 to end-2016, were identified. 
These were classified in a manner similar to that used in the work of Miller and Rowe 
(2012) and Van Niekerk (2017). Miller and Rowe (2012) analysed security incidents 
related to industrial control systems (ICS), categorising them by impact type and 
attack vector. In Van Niekerk (2017), security incidents affecting the transportation 
sector were considered, categorised by threat type and impact.
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Impact categories
For this study, the impacts were categorised as follows:
•	 data exposure, where records have been released;
•	 financial, where there was an attempt (successful or otherwise) to steal 
money;
•	 denial of service, where operations or services were affected;
•	 defacement, where webpages were altered;
•	 data corruption, where data was modified; and
•	 system penetration, where illegitimate access to networks or systems was 
achieved, but no other activity was apparent.
Perpetrator categories
The categorisation of the perpetrators (or key perpetuating factors) was as follows:
•	 hacktivist, where the perpetrator was affiliated to online activist groups 
making political statements;
•	 criminal, where the perpetrator was affiliated to criminal groups usually 
seeking financial gain;
•	 accidental/misconfiguration, where the incident was as a result of 
misconfigured systems;
•	 individual hacker, where the incident appeared to be to prove or develop 
individual skills;
•	 nation-state espionage, where the incident relates to state-sponsored threats;
•	 malware, where malware was discovered but no perpetrator or motivation 
can be established; and
•	 insider, where the perpetrator had legitimate access but acted maliciously for 
personal gain or reasons.
The incidents were analysed according to perpetrators and impacts, in terms of overall 
prevalence and trends over time. A pivot table is used to determine the prevalent 
threat-impact pairs. 
Victim categories
In order to determine if there is a noticeable relationship between the threat types 
and impacts associated with public organisations, the victims were categorised as: 
•	 state/political organisations; or
•	 other. 
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4. Findings and analysis
Impact type 
Figure 1 below shows the percentage distribution of the 54 incidents across the 
six impact types. As is evident, data exposure is the most prominent impact type. 
Financial, denial of service. and defacement are also noticeable.
Figure 1: Impact type
The findings are detailed according to their impact categories, moving from the most 
common impact category (data exposure) to the two least-common categories (data 
corruption, system penetration).
Data exposure
Data exposure was found to be the most common impact category. In 2008, the 
whistleblower site Wikileaks posted an unredacted version of a Competition 
Commission report about possible unethical practices by South African banks after 
removing the redaction (HomeGrownHoney, 2009). In 2010, a state hospital in the 
Western Cape was found to have an insecure site, and thousands of patient records 
could be accessed (Stone, 2010).
Advanced persistent threat (APTs) infections were also documented. An organisation 
in South Africa fell victim to the APT1 espionage group attributed to Chinese 
hackers, with the first major report occurring in 2010 (Mandiant, 2013). In 2012 the 
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Red October cyber-espionage campaign (attributed to Russian hackers) was detected, 
after having possibly operating for five years undetected, with various targets in a 
number of countries affected, including infecting a diplomatic organisation in South 
Africa (Limer, 2013; Paganini, 2013). 
Servers hosting the espionage tool FinFisher, usually employed by governments to 
track dissent, were detected in South Africa in 2013. The South African government 
denied using this tool (Vermeulen, 2013). Also in 2013, the Sednit/APT28 cyber-
espionage campaign, attributed to Russian hackers, targeted South African embassies 
via an infected document sent to the embassies purporting to be from the Department 
of International Relations and Cooperation (ESET, 2016; FireEye, 2014).
The South African Police Service suffered a hack in 2013 that resulted in the 
release of approximately 16,000 details of whistleblowers and victims. The attack 
appeared to be by the group Anonymous in response to the police killings of striking 
mineworkers at the Marikana mine (Roane, 2013; Tubbs, 2013). Also in 2013, a fast-
food outlet’s point-of-sale system was infected with the Dexter malware designed to 
steal customers’ credit card information (MyBroadband, 2013b). (Though this breach 
resulted in financial loss to the banks, the attack listed here only compromised the 
credit card information, and will therefore was classed as data exposure.)
Accidental data exposure incidents also occurred in 2013. A flaw in mobile operator 
Vodacom’s portal allowed any subscriber to access high level account summary 
information linked to any phone number (Muller, 2013). The City of Johannesburg’s 
invoicing portal was found to have vulnerabilities that could expose personal 
information, and the website was taken offline by the City – but then appeared to 
be operational a few days later with the vulnerability still present (MyBroadband, 
2013a). 
The year 2014 also saw both accidental and malicious data exposures. A flaw 
was discovered in mobile operator Cell C’s portal, allowing access to a number of 
customer records (MyBroadband, 2014). Altech Autopage suffered an accidental 
release of records (Patrick, 2015; Safenet, 2014). The South African National Roads 
Agency Limited (Sanral) E-Toll website was hacked, making the site vulnerable to 
release of personal details (Vermeulen, 2014). WooThemes was compromised, giving 
hackers access to financial information (Patrick, 2015; Safenet, 2014).
In 2016, Anonymous launched #OpAfrica, and its first South African target was 
an online job portal, V-Report, compromising 33,000 records (Vermeulen, 2016a). 
The state’s Government Communication and Information System (GCIS) was 
compromised shortly after V-Report, exposing the data of 1,500 government 
employees (Fripp, 2016; Vermeulen, 2016a). A number of web pages hosted by an 
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unnamed service provider were the next target for #OpAfrica, with 2,500 websites 
claimed to have been compromised (Fripp, 2016). Hackers affiliated with #OpAfrica 
compromised the state-owned arms procurement agency Armscor’s invoicing portal, 
releasing a number of purchasing information records (Van Zyl, 2016c). Cinema 
chain Ster Kinekor was hacked, with a release of approximately 6 million records 
in 2016 (Cave, 2017). The Chinese-linked group known as APT10 were involved 
in the Cloud Hopper espionage campaign in late 2016, or which there were South 
African victims (PwC and BAE Systems, 2017). As the majority of infections were 
late 2016, it is assumed this is the compromise date for the South African victims.
Accidental exposure again featured in 2016. The eThekwini Municipality (Durban) 
e-services portal was found to release customer information when the URL was 
edited, and the website was taken down to correct the error (Venktess, 2016). The 
e-billing portal of mobile operator MTN was found to be providing users with access 
to bills of other customers, and the website was taken offline to correct the error 
(MyBroadband, 2016). 
Financial
The first instance of financial impact identified in the documents occurred in 2003, 
when Absa bank lost approximately ZAR500,000 due to a hack (Thiel, 2004). 
Hackers targeted three South African banks in 2006, managing to transfer cash 
from bank accounts into prepaid accounts held with mobile operators. It appeared 
that information gained from key loggers (devices or software to record a user’s 
keystrokes) and phishing were used to conduct the hacks (Oiaga, 2006).
In July 2009, a criminal group acquired, via threats to an engineer at Vodacom, 
duplicate SIM cards that allowed for interception of online banking one-time PIN 
codes (OTPs) for bank accounts they had compromised via phishing. The group 
managed to steal in excess of ZAR7 million from the compromised accounts (Dingle, 
2009; Van Rooyen, 2009). The Land Bank initially lost ZAR8 million stolen through 
fraudulent transfers in December 2010 after hackers compromised the bank’s IT 
security possibly with inside help, but managed to recover most of money (Potgieter, 
2011). 
A credit card payment provider, PayGate, was compromised in August 2012, 
affecting four of the major banks and compromising “hundreds of thousands” of 
credit card details (Arde, 2012, p. 18). Though no details of financial losses were 
released, it is assumed that the banks suffered financial losses (Ajam, 2012; Arde, 
2012). Compromised passwords resulted in the National Department of Water 
Affairs losing ZAR2.84 million in 2011 (Patrick, 2015; Rasool, 2012). Postbank, 
the South African Post Office’s financial institution, had ZAR42 million stolen in 
January 2012 after hackers accessed servers via an employee’s workstation (Patrick, 
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2015; Rasool, 2012; Swart & Afrika, 2012). In 2013, over ZAR15 million was lost 
by the Department of Minerals and Energy after login credentials were stolen by
criminals using a keystroke logging device (Patrick, 2015; Tengimfene, 2013).
In 2014, state-owned electricity provider Eskom’s payroll system was hacked by 
employees, but the employees were prevented from making transfers by Eskom’s anti-
corruption units (Patrick, 2015; Speckman, 2015). In the same year, the Gautrain 
Management Agency’s bank account nearly lost ZAR800 million to a hack (Patrick, 
2015; Speckman, 2015). In 2015, the Road Traffic Management Corporation lost 
ZAR8.5 million to a series of illegal transfer by hackers (Mkhwanazi, 2015; Patrick, 
2015). In 2016, Standard Bank was targeted by hackers, who managed to steal 
approximately ZAR300,000 via thousands of ATMs in Japan (Van Zyl, 2016b).
Denial of service
A South African petrochemical company’s supervisory, control and data acquisition 
system was infected by the PE Sality virus in 2009, denying the operator’s visibility 
of operations for eight hours until the infected servers were recovered (Cusimano, 
2010; Pretorius, 2016). The aforementioned Sanral E-Toll website came under a 
denial-of-service attack in 2012, but the attack was not successful (SANews, 2012). It 
is assumed this attacker was conducted by hacktivists, given the ongoing controversy 
over the e-toll project.
In 2013, the website of the national ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC), was made inaccessible due to a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack 
by Anonymous Africa (different from Anonymous #OpAfrica) (Vermeulen, 2016b). 
Also in 2013, the Independent Online news website was targeted and access disrupted 
(Vermeulen, 2016b), and mobile operator MTN and affiliated service providers 
suffered a service outage due to a DDoS attack (ITNewsAfrica, 2013). MTN again 
suffered performance degradation in 2015 due to a DDoS attack (TelecomSpeak, 
2015). 
Anonymous Africa returned in 2016 by targeting the South African Broadcasting 
Corporation (SABC), whose website was unavailable due to the DDoS attack, 
with the hackers stating that the attack was in protest against corruption and the 
recent censoring of protests (Vermeulen, 2016b). Also in 2016, the websites of the 
news channel ANN7, The New Age newspaper, and computing company Sahara 
were targeted with DDoS attacks, in protest against perceived corruption by their 
owners and the South African government (Van Zyl, 2016a).  A series of denial-
of-service attacks was conducted against the Economic Freedom Fighters political 
party (Gorton, 2016).
Defacement
The websites of five major universities (University of Stellenbosch, Natal University, 
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Rhodes University and the University of the Witwatersrand and University of Cape 
Town) were defaced by hackers in 2003. Each website appeared to be attacked by a 
different hacker, and international hackers were suspected (Porter, 2003). In 2004, 45 
company websites in Cape Town and Stellenbosch were defaced by a group known 
as Spykids, who appeared to be motivated by a desire for recognition (Thiel, 2004). 
In January 2005, hackers from Morocco, known as Team Evil, defaced approximately 
260 South African websites, replacing the legitimate websites with anti-US messages 
(Mbongwa & Makua, 2005).
In 2008, the Democratic Alliance political party’s website was compromised and 
was offline for over a week; a spokesperson stated that it appeared to be common 
hacking, implying that is was not a targeted or political attack (Mail & Guardian, 
2008). The ANC Youth League website was defaced, with a fake message supposedly 
from the then Youth League president Julius Malema stating he was stepping down 
(Redelinghuis, 2011).
Three government websites were defaced by Moroccan hackers in 2012, protesting the 
official South Africa position on Western Sahara (Saville, 2012). The Administrative 
Adjudication of Road Traffic Offences website was defaced by a Bangladeshi 
hacker in 2013, who posted a message notifying the website owner to secure the 
website (ITWeb, 2013). Approximately 20 websites, including Sasol, were defaced 
by a Moroccan hacktivist in 2014, again protesting the South African position on 
Western Sahara (Ackroyd, 2014). 
Data corruption, system penetration
These two categories are the smallest, and are therefore presented together. They also 
represent the earliest three attacks reported. It is reported that in 1994 a right-wing 
hacker attempted to disrupt the first democratic elections in South Africa, but was 
detected after moving votes from the ANC to three right wing parties (Plaut, 2010). 
Stats SA’s website was targeted by hackers in 1999, who replaced data with negative 
comments about Telkom (BBC News, 1999). A teenage hacker managed to penetrate 
through Telkom (the state telephony operator) in 1998, however no damage was 
done. The teenager was arrested (Reuters, 1998).
Trends in impact type
Figure 2 below illustrates the trends for each of the six impact types between April 
1994 and end-2016. As can be seen, there were significant spikes in data exposure 
attacks in 2013, 2014 and 2016, and of denial of service attacks in 2013 and 2016. 
The number of financial-impact attacks, the third-most-common kind, remained 
largely stable from 2011 to 2016; and defacements, the fourth-most-frequent mode 
of attack, remained at a consistent level between 2011 and 2014 but were not found 
to be present in 2015 or 2016.
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Thus, the financial-crime motivation for hacking appears to be remaining somewhat 
constant, whereas the data exposure and denial of service motivations, often indicators 
of hacktivism and protest – i.e., they commonly used to discredit or exact revenge 
-- appear to be on the rise in the South African context. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that after reaching a total of 11 instances in 2013, 
there were declines in 2014 (7 instances) and 2015 (2 instances), before a spike to 
12 instances in 2016, the largest number recorded for any of the years studied – an 
apparent indication that cybersecurity measure are still not being effectively applied 
in South Africa, and/or that attempts at perpetration are becoming increasing 
complex and skilful.
Figure 2: Trends in impact type
Perpetrator type
Figure 3 presents the percentage distribution of the perpetration types. Hacktivist 
perpetrators – i.e., perpetrators affiliated to online activist groups making political 
statements – were found to be the most common, followed by criminals, then 
individual hackers, and then instances of accidental/misconfiguration due to non-
malicious insiders. 
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Figure 3: Perpetrator type
Figure 4 illustrates the trends in perpetrator type. Hacktivist perpetration has been 
present, off and on, since 1999, with slight increases in 2012 and 2012, and a sharp 
spike in 2016, indicating a growing protest and revenge dimension in South Africa’s 
cybersecurity risk profile. Another concerning trend is the increasing prevalence of 
cases of accidental/misconfiguration due to non-malicious insiders, non-existent 
before 2010 but representing three cases in each of 2014 and 2016. It was found that 
nation-state cyber-espionage perpetrators have only been active in South African 
cyberattacks since 2010, whereas individual hackers have had an intermittent 
presence throughout. 
Figure 4: Trends in perpetrator type
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Table 1 is a pivot table associating the perpetrator types to the impact types. 
The strongest association is between criminal hackers and a financial attacks (10 
instances), followed by accidental/misconfiguration due to non-malicious insiders 
resulting in data exposure (9 instances). These are followed by hacktivists exposing 
data (6 instances) and hacktivists denying service (6 instances), and then nation-state 
espionage perpetration seeking to expose (and presumably gain) data. 
Whilst the prevalence of criminal activity is almost a given, data exposure due to 
error (accidental/misconfiguration) is presumably much more easily prevented than 
criminal activity should be of particular concern to South African institutions. 
Table 1: Impacts by perpetrator type
Impacts
Data 
exposure
Denial 
of 
service
Financial Deface-ment
Data 
corruption
System 
penetration Totals
Accidental/ 
miscon-
figuration
9 9
Criminal 1 10 11
Hacktivist 6 6 4 1 17
Insider 1 1
Malware 1 1 2
Nation-state 
espionage 5 5
Individual 
hacker 2 1 4 1 1 9
Totals 22 9 12 8 2 1 54
Victim type
Figure 5 presents the distribution of victims in terms of state/political entities and 
other entities. As can be seen, it was found that attacks targeting the state/political 
entities represented more than half of the 54 attacks documented.
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Figure 5: Victim type
Figure 6 below llustrates the trends over time for the two victim categories. While the 
first attack on a state/political entity was detected in the first year of study, 1994, the 
first attacks on a non-state/political entity was only documented in 2003. However, 
in two of the most recent years studied, 2014 and 2016, attacks on non-state/political 
entities outnumbered state/political breaches.
Figure 6: Trends in victim type
Table 2 below is a pivot table illustrating associations been impacts and victim types. 
There does not appear to be any significant difference between the distribution of 
impact types for the two victim types
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Table 2: Impacts by victim type
Impacts
Data 
exposure
Denial 
of 
service
Financial Defacement Datacorruption
System
penetration Totals
Other 12 5 5 3 25
State/
political 10 4 7 5 2 1 29
Total 22 9 12 8 2 1 54
Table 3 below presents the perpetrator types associated with each of the two victim 
types. As before, nothing significant can be determined from these figures. The fact 
that hacktivists and nation-state perpetrators targeted state and political victims 
more than other organisations is logical. The state or political may have more impact 
from most perpetrators due to a lack of information security capability at those 
organisations.
Table 3: Perpetrator by victim type 
Perpetrator
Acci-
dental/
mis-
config-
uration
Criminal Hacktivist Individual hacker Insider Malware
Nation-
state 
espionage
Total
Other 5 5 7 4 2 2 25
State/
political 4 6 10 5 1 3 29
Total 9 11 17 9 1 2 5 54
5. Conclusions 
This research has shown that in South Africa, the leading perpetrators of cyber-
attacks are hacktivists and criminals. The top two cyber-attack impacts are data 
exposure and financial theft. The top two perpetration-impact combinations are 
criminals resulting in financial impact, and accidental/misconfiguration resulting in 
data exposure. 
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Given the prevalence of cyber-crime globally, the criminal appearance as a top 
perpetrator, linked to a top impact, is unsurprising. As Internet connectivity in Africa 
increases and a greater percentage of the population has Internet access, we can 
expect the rate of cyber-crime to increase, targeting, among others, new entrants who 
are not yet fully aware of the security risks. Due the increasing financial impact of 
cyber-incidents, it is imperative that the legislative environment is enabled to afford 
corporations protection and support law-enforcement in combatting cyber-attacks.
The increase in hacktivism in South Africa, notable in the data for 2016, can be 
linked to increased political tensions in the country (Vermeulen, 2016b). Even 
some of the non-state/non-political organisations targeted were linked to perceived 
government corruption (Van Zyl, 2016a). None of the organisations targeted, nor 
the way they were targeted, appeared to have any major direct impact on national 
stability or the national economy. However, there are at present certain large state-
owned enterprises in South Africa, also linked to the political scandals, which have 
not yet been targeted. Should, for instance, the major electricity provider, Eskom, 
be attacked and for some reason operations hindered, there could be significant 
socioeconomic ramifications.
The numerous instances of cybersecurity threats caused by accidental/misconfiguration 
perpetration is concerning, as they have all occurred since the POPI Bill of 2009. It 
is possible that the Bill resulted in increased awareness and, in turn, an increase in 
exposures being reported. However, it still suggests that organisations, both state/
political and other neglecting their responsibility to ensure that the systems are 
configured correctly. A possible solution will be to focus cyber-security awareness 
training on IT professionals in the country, in order to assist in creating a secure 
culture and an improvement of security in system development. Moreover, once 
the POPI Act is fully enforced and organisations are held fully accountable for 
such breaches, more effort may be given to discovering flaws, thereby reducing the 
accidental exposure.
Nation-state espionage is relatively low, and this is consistent with the findings of the 
report by Brown and Rudis (2017). At the same time, it is interesting to note that 
two of the nations most commonly associated with cyber-espionage campaigns – 
Russia and China – belong to a club of countries, the BRICS, of which South Africa 
is also a member along with Brazil and India. As can be seen from the revelations 
of the United States and Western European nations spying on each other, even 
allied countries conduct espionage operations against each other. Therefore as global 
tensions rise, South Africa should not be surprised if economic friendly countries 
increase espionage activities to monitor its politics and foreign policy. This concept, 
known as the “cyber-security dilemma”, is discussed by Buchanan (2017). This in 
turn may also instigate an increase of international hacktivist activity. 
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Overall, the prevalence of perpetration factors and actors, and the impacts, that 
this study found in South Africa are consistent with reported international cyber-
incident trends. A limitation of this study is that the data available were limited to 
what is reported publicly. Until it is mandatory for South African organisations to 
report cyber-incidents, it will be difficult to conduct in-depth assessments of the 
composition of threat activities and their impacts. 
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